Lavizan 3 Revelation.

Tuesday, 24 February 2015

 

NCRI Reveals

 

Details of an underground top-secret site currently used by the Iranian regime for research and development with advanced centrifuges for uranium enrichment

 

Since 2008, the Iranian regime has engaged in research and uranium enrichment with advanced IR-2m, IR-3 and IR-4 centrifuges under the cover of an Intelligence Ministry center

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The Iranian regime has built underground tunnel and 4 halls, that are underneath a Ministry of Intelligence building of the Matiran Company t. An elevator in this building leads to this underground facility.

Introduction

The following information is the result of a decade-long, detailed, risky and complex effort by the network of the NCRI’s main component, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) inside Iran.

The MEK has obtained this intelligence from highly placed sources within the Iranian regime as well as those involved in the nuclear weapons projects. The process of vetting and corroborating this information involved multiple sources, acting independent of one another over a span of many years. The vetting and verification process has just been completed enabling us to reveal this information now.

Executive Summary

1. Despite the Iranian regime’s claims that all of its enrichment activities are transparent and under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, it has in fact been engaged in research and development with advanced centrifuges at a secret nuclear site called Lavizan-3, in a military base in northeast Tehran suburbs.

2. Since 2008, the Iranian regime has secretly engaged in research and uranium enrichment with advanced IR-2m, IR-3 and IR-4 centrifuge machines at this site.

3. The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is directly responsible for the protection and security of this complex; disguising it as a secret MOIS center, unrelated to nuclear activities, to prevent it from being identified as a secret nuclear site.

4. This site is located in an area of about 500 by 500 meters, (250,000 m2; roughly 62 acres). The primary nuclear site is buried deep underground in tunnels and underground facilities spanning about 2000 m2 (0.5 acres).

5. To go to the underground site, an elevator descends several stories, deep underground and opens into a 200-meter tunnel, which leads to four parallel halls. Because the ground is inclined, the halls are deeper underground, as deep as approximately 50 meters.

6. Each of the halls is 40 by 10 meter (400 m2). The four halls are 50 meters apart from one another.

7. The halls have 3 by 3 meter and 40 centimeter-thick, radiation proof doors. There is shielding material, including lead, inside the doors to prevent radiation leak. (Enclosed is a picture of one of the shielding doors of the underground facility in Lavizan-3)

8. The underground facilities are dual layered to prevent radiation and sound leaks.

9. The Defense Ministry has built these tunnels and underground facilities under the direction of IRGC Brig. Gen. Seyyed Ali Hosseini-Tash, the then Deputy Defense Minister.

10. Kalaye Electric Company, affiliated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and responsible for enrichment has overseen the construction of this site. Morteza Behzad, an engineer and key nuclear official, who played a major role in starting up the Fordo underground uranium enrichment site, was in charge of managing Lavizan-3.

Details of the Revelation

1. Lavizan-3 site is used for research and development as well as uranium enrichment with advanced centrifuges.

2. Since 2008, the Iranian regime has secretly engaged in research and uranium enrichment with advanced IR-2m, IR-3 and IR-4 centrifuge machines at this site.

3. Kalaye Electric Company, affiliated with the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran has overseen the construction of this site. Kalaye Electric has been involved in uranium enrichment for the Iranian regime and pursued different parts of the construction, including the manufacturing and installation of centrifuges as well as enrichment activities[1].

4. Morteza Behzad, an engineer, who played a key part in starting up the underground uranium enrichment site, Fordo, near the city of Qom, and the liaison between the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the Defense Ministry, was among the managers of Lavizan-3 site[2].

5. This site is among a collection of complexes built on the orders of IRGC Brig. Gen. Seyyed Ali Hosseini-Tash[3], the then Deputy Defense Minister, whose job has been to pursue the building of nuclear weapons. At the time, the entity responsible for building nuclear weapons, Center for Defensive Preparedness and Technology, was headed by Mohsen Fakhrizadeh Mahabadi, and operated under the direction of Hosseini-Tash. In recent years, the entity in charge of manufacturing nuclear weapons is called Defensive Innovation and Research Organization, known by its Farsi acronym, SPND. Hosseini-Tash is currently the deputy to the Supreme National Security Council.

6. Experts in Center for Defensive Preparedness and Technology (Fakhar Moghaddam Group), which is part of SPND, have joined senior experts of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to carry out enrichment research. Fakhar Moghaddam Group is tasked with nuclear physics research and production of enriched uranium.

Ownership of the site

1. The garrison housing this site is located within a military zone, which belonged to the Iranian Army under the Shah. It is considered a restricted military zone.

2. The land was handed over to the Prime Ministry’s Office in 1972.

3. Following the 1979 revolution, the land was transferred to the Ministry of Intelligence and Security. But local residents have been told it belongs to the President’s Office.

Location of the site

1. This site is located in km 3 of Army Boulevard (formerly Lashkarak highway), in the northeastern suburbs of Tehran. (See the satellite imagery).

2. It is situated in a piece of land, approximately 500 by 500 m (an area of 250,000 m2, approximately 62 acres).

3. Army Boulevard (three kilometers from Araj Square) is on the north side of the site. Shahmoradi Street is to the east. Ghamar Bani-Hashem Street is to the west and residential apartments of Lavizan-3 (Khoshrou Township) are to the south of this site. Lavizan-3 Township is the residential quarters for Army commanders and entry requires special permission.

4. There are two distinct sections at this site, separated by a wall. The northern gate of this complex at the Army Boulevard and the northeastern gate on Shahmoradi Street are always closed and only opened with prior notice and permission. But the southern gate at Shahmoradi Street, where the Matiran Company is located, is controlled by sentry guards.

5. A separate complex, 170 by 170 m is located in the southeastern part of this site. A two-story building 70 by 70 m is built in the middle of this area. According to our intelligence, one of the doors of the tunnel is underneath this building.

6. The building inside the area is white and the walls around it are built with red bricks and are about three meters tall.

7. After 2010, a six-story building was reconstructed or built from scratch in the northern section of this site. This building and several other buildings are within the larger area of this complex.

Front Entity to Cover Up the Site:

1. Following the exposure of Natanz and Arak sites in August 2002, Kalaye Electric site in February 2003 and Lavizan-Shian site in May 2003 by the NCRI, based on the information from the network inside Iran of its main component organization, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), the MOIS conducted a security assessment. Accordingly, the regime decided to task the MOIS with the protection of its nuclear projects and facilities. One of the most important sites was the Lavizan-3 research facility. The MOIS took responsibility and specified the type of protective cover and security arrangement for it.

2. The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is directly responsible for the protection and security of this complex; disguising it as a secret MOIS center, unrelated to nuclear activities, to prevent it from being identified as a secret nuclear site.

3. The entire site is under the supervision of the Intelligence Ministry’s Technical Directorate and consists of two sections: Jamal Complex and Matiran Company.

4. Jamal Complex is comprised of several large buildings and complexes. The main building in this complex is a six-story building northeast of the area. An Intelligence Ministry director, Sabeti is in charge of this complex. The head of security is an official named Mo’azam.

5. The second part of this complex is Matiran Company, which is located in the southern section of the garrison and is separated from the other areas by a wall.

6. Matiran Company is part of the Intelligence Ministry’s Technical Directorate, and produces digital identification cards, birth certificates and other security-related cards. The advanced laser printers of the company are located in the upper floors of this square-shaped building at the site.

7. Hamid Shoaibi is the head of the Matiran Company and is also the head of “Organization of the Country’s Security Documents,” a part of the Intelligence Ministry.[4]

Specifications of the Underground Facilities

1. The main nuclear activities site is underground, inside the tunnels and underground facilities, spanning more than 2000 m2 (0.5 acres).

2. The workshops are built underground. To get there, an elevator descends several stories deep underground and opens into a 200-meter long tunnel, which leads to four parallel halls. Because the ground is inclined, the halls are deeper in the ground, as deep as 50 meters.

3. Each of the halls is about 400 m2; 10 by 40 meters. And the parallel halls are built 50 meters apart from one another.

4. The halls have 3 by 3 m radiation proof doors that are 40 centimeters thick and weigh about 8 tons. There is shielding material inside the doors, including lead to prevent radiation leak.

5. The walls of the tunnels are dual-layered in order to prevent radiation and sound leak.

6. The underground facilities have special ventilation and air conditioning systems, which prevent the underground activities from emitting radiation and other fumes, which would expose the nature of these activities.

7. Forklifts are used to move around the equipment and material inside the tunnels.

The Construction Entity

1. The Hara Company, which is a part of the Khatam al-Anbia Garrison of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, has built these tunnels. Hara has constructed other secret defense projects.[5] IRGC Brig. Gen. Mehdi Etessam was in charge of Hara when these tunnels were built. Ali Alizadeh was in charge of the secret defense projects of Hara and Mohsen Karimi was the Director of its Technical Directorate. Since November 2014, Karim Ganjeh has been in charge of Hara Company.

2. Intelligence indicates that excavating the tunnels began in early 2004. The underground facilities were completed around 2008. The construction took longer because Hara Company tried to be least visible and minimize the noise generated by the excavating equipment underground.

3. The underground site was built by the Defense Ministry for Brig. Gen. Seyyed Ali Hosseini-Tash, the then-Deputy Defense Minister.

The Site’s Security Arrangements

1. Because this site was built in a piece of land owned and controlled by the Intelligence Ministry, the MOIS maximized security measures. Since the start of construction, the Ministry made some changes to keep the nuclear activities secret.

2. There are sentry guards at the entrance of the site and the entire complex has closed circuit monitors. There are seven sentry posts around the site, which points to maximum security.

3. During the construction of the site, several code names were used. Some agencies were told the site was “Ozgol Headquarters” of the Iranian regime’s Air Force. Local residents were told this was part of the Presidential Complex. This is very similar to the disguise used to keep the Fordo site secret. The regime had described it as an IRGC missile site, called Nour al-Mehdi Garrison.

4. Because of the sensitivity of Shahmoradi Street, the end of the street is closed with a large gate, making it a dead-end street. Only the personnel of the military centers and those residing in the same street. (In addition to Lavizan-3 site, a military residential complex, called 64-unit, an Army Garrison called Baharvar, and an electronic industry spare parts factory [among the Electronic Group factories affiliated with the Defense Ministry] are located on Shahmoradi Street.)

Conclusion:

Despite the Iranian regime’s claims of transparency in its nuclear activities today’s intelligence makes it clear that it has been continuing to lie for more than a decade. Research and Development with advanced centrifuges in secret sites are only intended to advance the nuclear weapons project. While the regime deceived the world into believing that it had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, it had been in fact heavily involved in preparing this nuclear site from 2004 to 2008.

If the United States is serious about preventing the Iranian regime from obtaining nuclear weapons, it must make the continuation of the talks conditional on IAEA’s immediately inspecting the Lavizan-3 site. Any delay in doing so will enable the regime to destroy the evidence as it has done in the past.

On October 30, 2014, Secretary Kerry said that one of the “four present pathways to a bomb for Iran” is through “covert activities,” and that “our goal is to shut off each pathway.” Our intelligence today demonstrates that the covert advancement of the nuclear program is the most serious pathway the Iranian regime is pursuing.

Therefore, if the US and its partners in P5+1 seek to block Tehran’s pathway to the bomb, they must demanding the following:

1. Complete implementation of all Security Council Resolutions.

2. Immediate halt to any enrichment and the closure of related facilities, including Natanz, Fordo and Arak.

3. Signing the Additional Protocol and the start of IAEA’s snap and unconditional inspection of all sites and unhindered access to documents and experts suspected of being involved in the nuclear project.

The notion that the Iranian regime will abandon their nuclear weapons program thru nuclear talks is misguided and the byproduct of the mullahs’ duplicity and western economic and political expediency. Those who hope to secure the regime’s cooperation in the campaign against extremism by offering concessions to the mullahs are both increasing the chances of a nuclear-armed Iran and contributing to the spread of Islamic extremism.

The ultimate solution to prevent the nightmare of extremists becoming nuclear is though firmness, comprehensive sanctions and support for the Iranian people and their Resistance as they strive to change the theocratic regime in Iran.

[1] Kalaye Electric site, located on the Damavand Highway, northeast of Tehran, was exposed by the NCRI in February 2003 and was immediately requested to be inspected by the IAEA; which was granted several months later. The IAEA discovered that the site had been a uranium enrichment testing facility after finding traces of highly enriched uranium there. Up to 50 centrifuges had been cascaded to carry out research. The research conducted at Lavizan-3 is similar to the research at Kalaye Electric before it was exposed by the NCRI.

[2] Morteza Behzad is a key official in the Iranian regime’s nuclear program involved in starting up Fordo enrichment site near the city of Qom. He was the liaison between Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the Defense Ministry and was included in the UN Security Council’s sanctions list, (see 3 March 2008 Annex I of resolution 1803) and “designated for involvement in making centrifuge components.”

[3] According to Hassan Rouhani’s book, “National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy,” Hossieni-Tash was a key member of the Nuclear Committee in the Supreme National Security Council. The NCRI exposed him in 2004 as the official responsible for nuclear weapons manufacturing in Iran.

[4] Experts working at the Matiran Company, which is located in the square building at Lavizan-3 site include Majid Shafiee, Production Manager, Massoud Taghipour, Design Section and Abbas Khodaverdi, Chief Technical Officer.

[5] Listed in an annex to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 of June 9, 2010, as an IRGC entity with a role “in Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.”

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By Carol Morello, The Washington Post, February 25, 2015

An Iranian exile group on Tuesday accused Iran’s government of conducting secret research with the aim of developing nuclear weapons, even as it is negotiating potential constraints on its ability to do so.

The National Council of Resistance of Iran said underground labs in suburban Tehran have been used since 2008 to enrich uranium. It said the plant, named Lavizan-3 after the neighborhood where many officers and their families live, is reached through tunnels leading from under a building ostensibly used to process passports and identity cards.

The claims could not be independently verified and U.S. officials initially declined to comment. On Wednesday, a State Department spokeswoman said officials “have no information at this time to support such a conclusion.”

“We have seen these claims and we take all such reports seriously,” said spokeswoman Jen Psaki.

Representatives of the opposition group, appearing at the National Press Club before a flag dating from pre-revolutionary Iran, detailed their claims as Secretary of State John F. Kerry testified before Congress, defending the administration’s ongoing nuclear talks with Iran.

Negotiators want to reach the broad outlines of an agreement by late March, though many highly complex technical details would still have to be hashed out before an interim agreement expires in late June.

The Iranian opposition group said Iran has lied about its nuclear program before, and no deal should be signed until Tehran agrees to inspections of the Lavizan-3 facility.

“It’s absolutely senseless to continue negotiations and decide the number of centrifuges you’re going to have if we have these serious issues lingering out there,” said Alireza Jafarzadeh, deputy director of the group’s Washington office.

Over more than a decade, the NCRI has made several assertions about Iran’s nuclear program, not all of which have proved accurate. In 2002, however, the group exposed the existence of two nuclear-related plants, one in Natanz for uranium enrichment and a heavy water reactor near Arak.

Tehran hadn’t acknowledged either previously, and the discovery has fueled a level of distrust that persists to this day.

The latest claims come at a particularly sensitive time in the talks over Iran’s nuclear program. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is due to address Congress next week, where he is expected to assert that a deal with Iran is dangerous for Israel and the world.

His audience will include members of Congress, including some Democrats, who are skeptical of Iran’s claims that its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes, and many want to impose more sanctions on Iran.

The administration fears more sanctions will drive Iran away from the negotiating table, where it is talking with the United States and its partners — France, Britain, Germany, China and Russia — and to resume its uranium enrichment program.

The National Council of Resistance of Iran said the sources of its latest claims came from inside Iran, including from some who are in the government.

Satellite images the group culled from Google showed a large, walled complex of buildings at the foothills of the mountains outside Tehran. They also exhibited photographs purportedly taken inside the tunnel showing a steel door that they said was lined with lead to prevent radiation leaks.

Jafarzadeh said it took a full decade to gather intelligence about the facility. Most of it came from members of the controversial Mujahedin-e Khalq, which started out devoted to armed struggle against the shah and then kept fighting against the theocratic government that overthrew him. The MEK is part of the NCRI, and the State Department listed it as a terrorist organization until 2012.

Robert Einhorn, a senior fellow with the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative at the Brookings Institution, said the allegations should be investigated by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is tasked with monitoring Iran’s facilities. The IAEA declined to comment.

“Every credible lead like this has to be pursued,” Einhorn said. “I don’t think you can dismiss the allegations out of hand. But the background is this organization has been right sometimes and has sometimes been quite wrong.”

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Tells Congress doubts must be answered before deal can go forward

February 25, 2015

By Guy Taylor – The Washington Times – Wednesday, February 25, 2015 Secretary of State John F. Kerry said Wednesday that a final nuclear deal with Iran could be derailed if new allegations from an Iranian dissident group that Iran is running a secret uranium enrichment operation at a facility near Tehran prove true.

Mr. Kerry told lawmakers that U.S. officials knew of charges related the site prior to this week, but that “it has not been revealed yet as a nuclear facility.”

“It is a facility that we are well aware of, which is on a list of facilities we have,” the secretary of state said during a Capitol Hill budget hearing on Wednesday morning. “I’m not going to go into greater detail.”

“But these things are obviously going to have to be resolved as we go forward,” he said.

Mr. Kerry made the comments during a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, in which lawmakers raised questions about the revelations Tuesday by the National Coalition of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a dissident group that claimed the secret facility has never before been revealed to international officials.

At a press conference, the group said the underground facility on the outskirts of Tehran is known as “Lavizan-3” and has been used for clandestine nuclear research since 2008 — as well as for uranium enrichment with advanced IR-2m and IR-4 centrifuge machines.

The NCRI’s claim was not immediately verifiable, and the dissident group is known for having a controversial history in Washington. However, the group is seen to have deep sources inside Iran’s nuclear community and its members are credited with having made game-changing revelations about Tehran’s activities in the past.

Most notably, during the early 2000s, similar NCRI claims exposed the existence of Iran’s Natanz uranium enrichment facility and the Arak heavy-water plutonium facility — two operations that have been at the center of international scrutiny and distrust of Tehran during the years since then.

Rep. Brad Sherman, California Democrat, noted to Mr. Kerry Wednesday that “the MEK sometimes gives us accurate information.”

“They are the ones that told the world about the Iranian nuclear program,” Mr. Sherman said. “They now say that there’s a secret facility at Lavizan 3.”

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Agence France Presse

Washington: An exiled Iranian opposition group Tuesday accused Tehran of running a “secret” uranium enrichment site close to Tehran, which it said violated ongoing talks with global powers on a nuclear deal.

“Despite the Iranian regime’s claims that all of its enrichment activities are transparent … it has in fact been engaged in research and development with advanced centrifuges at a secret nuclear site called Lavizan-3,” said Alireza Jafarzadeh, deputy director of the National Council of Resistance of Iran(NCRI).

He said the site was hidden in a military base in the northeastern suburbs of Tehran.

He presented to reporters a series of satellite images drawn from Google Maps which he said backed “this intelligence from highly placed sources within the Iranian regime as well as those involved in the nuclear weapons projects.”

The Lavizan-3 site was apparently constructed between 2004 and 2008 and has underground labs connected by a tunnel.

“Since 2008, the Iranian regime has secretly engaged in research and uranium enrichment with advanced… centrifuge machines at this site,” Jafarzadeh said.

The group had shared its information with the US administration, he added.

The existence of the site was “a clear violation” of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as UN resolutions and an interim November 2013 deal struck with global powers gathered in the P5+1 group, he said.

Under the interim accord, Iran agreed not to allow “any new locations for enrichment” and to provide IAEA, the UN nuclear watchdog, all information about its nuclear facilities.

“It is absolutely senseless to continue the negotiations,” added Jafarzadeh.

The NCRI is a political umbrella of five Iranian opposition groups, the largest of which is the People’s Mujahedeen Organization of Iran, which was once banned in Europe and the United States as a terror group.

The People’s Mujahedeen has long opposed the nuclear negotiations, and with the NCRI has made several important revelations of the existence of secret nuclear sites in Iran.

The so-called P5+1 group of Britain, China, France, Russia, the United States and Germany is trying to strike an accord that would prevent Tehran from developing a nuclear bomb.

In return, the West would ease sanctions imposed on Tehran over its nuclear program, which Iran insists is purely civilian in nature.

A new March 31 deadline is looming for agreement on a political framework, after two previous dates for a comprehensive deal were missed.

“Despite the Iranian regime’s claims of transparency, these nuclear activities, today’s intelligence, makes clear it has been continuing to lie for more than a decade,” added NCRI member Soona Samsami.

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Tehran terrified of revelation of secret nuclear site

New details about Lavizan-3 and fresh calls for immediate IAEA inspections

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The original image obtained by NCRI long ago. The background shows parts of the GMP workshop where the door was built for Lavizan-3

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The picture uploaded on the GMP website, which is a crop of the original image obtained by NCRI

Washington, DC, Feb. 27 – Subsequent to the Iranian Resistance’s revelations about the Lavizan-3 site, which the religious fascism ruling Iran had hidden for years, panic and fear have set in among the leaders of the regime, who are extremely worried about the implications of the disclosure of the new nuclear site.

Instead of inviting International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to visit the location, the regime sidestepped simple questions about Lavizan-3 – the nature of the site and the activities there – and unleashed a barrage of insults, fallacies, red herrings, and lies.

When all such gesturing proved ineffective, the clerical regime fell back on another tactic, thrusting its agents to the scene to claim that the door, the picture of which was displayed during Tuesday’s press conference, was an image grabs from the website of a safe manufacturer company called GMP. On February 26, the regime’s official news agency IRNA quoted a state-affiliated website as saying, “It was claimed that the picture shows an explosive-proof vault door related to the site. … The picture was taken by a fire-proof door manufacturer GMP and is available on its website.” The carbon copy of this story was then disseminated through a large number of other state-affiliated media outlets.

However, the multi-year investigations of the MEK and the NCRI’s Security and Anti-terrorism and Defense and Strategic Research committees are comprehensive and detailed enough that the regime cannot sweep the scandal under the carpet by resorting to such lies.

The NCRI-US would like to make public the following additional points with respect to GMP, as well as the picture based on information obtained by MEK sources inside Iran:

  1. While the regime wants to portray GMP as a private safe manufacturer, it is in fact a state-affiliated enterprise disguised as a private company. It specializes in manufacturing heavy explosive-proof, radiation-resistant doors, and bullet-proof vaults, winning customers exclusively from the regime’s military institutions, defense ministry, intelligence ministry, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and the National Iranian Oil Company.
  2. The company manufactures doors to protect weapons depots operated by state organs such as the Intelligence Ministry. Some of the doors are small enough to allow people to go through while some are large enough to allow vehicle passage. Last year, the company produced explosive-proof doors for Pars Garma in Gachsaran, which is affiliated with the defense ministry. Pars Garma was previously exposed by the Iranian Resistance and is involved in digging a number of tunnels for the IRGC Space and Aviation Organization (which produces missiles) as well as the regime’s nuclear installations.
  3. In 2004, Kalaye Electric Company ordered four doors from GMP. Kalaye Electric’s go between with GMP was an individual named Shahbazian, an acquaintance of Farrokh Esfandiari, the Director General of GMP.  At the time, the cost of building each door was about $30,000, with a construction time of roughly three months. Their dimensions were 3m x 3m, with a thickness of 40 cm, each weighing 8 tons. The doors are made from two thick metal with shielding layers including lead in the middle designed to block radiation. The doors are custom built and information about them is classified. The client vets the quality of the parts, with some parts imported from abroad.
  4. Three documents showing the company’s communications with the Defense Ministry have been obtained by the Iranian Resistance. One of those documents outlines specifications and calculations concerning radiation-proof doors. A part of the document regarding radiation-proof doors has been posted on the company website. In a catalogue on radiation-proof doors, which have been installed at Lavizan-3, GMP notes that the doors are used for “nuclear facilities” and have “military applications for nuclear and laser systems.” On its website, however, the section on “military applications for nuclear and laser systems” has been removed.
  5. The catalogue specifies, “This product ranks among products that may potentially be used in the nuclear energy program and remains under sanctions. External procurement is impractical and importing them is not financially feasible due to the high overall costs – roughly four times the cost of production by this company, which yields the same quality of product.” Clearly, GMP is well aware of the applications of these doors in nuclear installations.
  6. USA Today wrote in its Friday edition that GMP posted a picture of the doors installed at Lavizan-3 on its website on February 12, 2015. The Iranian Resistance, however, had obtained a number of such pictures long before. The original of the picture displayed during the press conference on February 24 shows the same door as well as an extensive portion of the GMP workshop, which is different from the picture posted on the company’s website and could not have been a downloaded copy. The two pictures, one posted on the website and the other, the original of the picture displayed at the press conference, have been enclosed.
  7. The NCRI-US repeats its calls to the IAEA and P5+1, especially the U.S. government, to enable UN inspectors to immediately visit the site before the Iranian regime can destroy evidence of wrongdoing as it did with regards to the Lavizan-Shian location. Otherwise, continuing negotiations with this regime and any form of agreement with it would amount to accepting its deceptive tactics while leaving the door open for the acquisition of a nuclear weapon by the godfather and banker of international terrorism.

U.S. Representative Office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran